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For years the world has lived under the 
threat o f a nuclear war. Millions who grew up 
in the shadow o f the Bomb have learnt to live 
with and even accept the unstable ‘peace’ o f 
the nuclear ‘balance o f terror’ . The certainty 
that any nuclear attack by one o f the 
Superpow ers would in sta n tly  in v o lve  
massive retaliation, has helped the world to 
get to 1978 without a second use o f nuclear 
weapons.
But, how much longer can it last? Can the 
nuclear world survive into the 21st century? 
For the name o f the nuclear strategy game 
has changed.
The accelerating arms race and the 
technological advances o f the 1970s, coupled 
with the loom ing dangers of the plutonium 
economy, make the chances o f survival seem 
daily more remote. Whether, in fact, a 
nuclear holocaust will eventuate however, 
depends on many factors, not least on the 
ability o f world forces for change prevailing 
over imperialism. But that time is running 
short there is no doubt.
This year has seen a marked deterioration 
in international relations and increasing 
tensions between West and East bloc 
countries, and in other areas. The Middle 
East continues to be a major flash-point with 
the ever-present danger o f widening conflict;
on the African continent and elsewhere the 
struggle for id eo log ica l and m ilitary 
supremacy continues. And the conflict 
between Kampuchea and Viet Nam and 
China’s worsening relations with Viet Nam, 
are closely connected to the mutual distrust 
and jostling for position o f China and the 
Soviet Union.
Ironically, it was the UN first-ever Special 
Session on Disarmament in May which 
highlighted the shaky detente between the 
two Superpowers, neither o f whom sent their 
Heads o f  State. Instead, President Carter 
attended a NATO war-planning meeting in 
Washington and spoke of confrontation with 
the Soviet Union. Soon after, the outcry 
against the trials o f the Soviet dissidents was 
used to further a re-emergence o f Cold War 
hysteria and fear.
Counterforce Strategy
In the early 1960s some American hawks 
wanted to move from ‘deterrence’ to a 
position o f nuclear superiority, and by the 
late 1960s the shift was underway. It is now 
clear that with the tremendous technological 
advances in weaponry in the 1970s and 
emphasis on quality rather than quantity, 
United States’ policy has decidedly shifted 
to w a rd s  a ‘ C o u n t e r f o r c e ’ s tra te g y .
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Translated this means an unanswerable 
first strike capacity.
Form er Lockheed en gin eer and US 
weapons expert, Robert Aldridge, estimates 
that the US should achieve a first-strike 
capacity by the mid-1980s — i.e. in about 
seven years from now. (1)
Defense Secretary, Robert McNamara, 
first expounded the new Counterforce 
doctrine in June 1962. Am erica’s “ principal 
military objective should be the destruction 
o f the enemy’s military forces, not his 
civilian population” , he said. (2) The 
previous year, President Kennedy had stated 
that “ our arms will never be used to strike the 
first blow” , but it was clear his Defense 
Secretary was elaborating a plan, and 
retargeting his missiles, to give the US that 
capability.
Twelve years later, in 1975, Defense 
Secretary S ch lesin ger rephrased the 
doctrine. While telling a Senate Foreign 
Relations Subcommittee that the US has “ no 
desire to develop a counterforce capability 
against the Soviet U nion” , he nevertheless 
went on: “ What we wish to avoid is the Soviet 
Union having a counterforce capability 
against the United States without our being 
able to have a comparable capability.”  
(Emphasis added.) The President must not 
be limited to any single strategy, Schlesinger 
said, but must have the capacity f; ir “ flexible 
response” . (3)
In February 1974 Schlesinger told a Senate 
hearing on the military budget that “ We 
have no announced counterforce strategy, if 
by counterforce one infers that one is going to 
attempt to destroy silos. We have a new 
targeting doctrine th at em phasizes 
selectivity and flexibility” . (Emphasis
added.) And on May 30_1975 Schlesinger
admitted publicly that the US would 
consider using nuclear weapons first to stop 
communist advances such as in Europe and 
Korea. (4)
The new targeting doctrine is designed to 
make limited nuclear war acceptable — after 
all, it sounds more humane to retaliate 
against military targets than population 
areas. But the very concept o f limited nuclear 
war flies in the face o f the inevitable logic o f 
escalation to total force usage. As the 
authoritative Stockholm International 
P eace  R e se a rch  In s t itu te  (S IP R I)  
c o m m e n t e d  a f t e r  S c h l e s i n g e r ’ s
announcement: “ In making nuclear war 
more ‘flexible’ (the new doctrine) makes it 
more th inkable , m ore tolerable  and 
consequently more probable” . (5)
The likelihood o f  ‘ limited’ nuclear strikes 
escalating to an all-out nuclear war in which 
both sides would be devastated, means that 
the only plausible reason for the US 
developing a counterforce capability is to 
a ch ieve the ca p a city  to launch  an 
unanswerable first strike against the Soviet 
Union.
The Arms Race
To understand how the US is moving 
towards that capacity, one needs to examine 
the current state o f  the arm s race, 
particularly technological developments.
The size o f the world’s nuclear stockpiles is 
staggering — representing the capacity to 
destroy every person on earth 24 times over. 
Or put another way, the US could destroy 
every person in the Soviet Union 40 times 
over and the Soviet Union could destroy 
every American 20 times over. These 
frightening, i f  somewhat ludicrous statistics 
illustrate the insanity o f the runaway 
nuclear arms race. (Not to mention the 
insanity o f diverting $400 billion a year 
away from spending on health, alleviating 
poverty and other pressing social needs.)
SIPRI Director, Frank Barnaby, gives the 
following picture o f  the Superpowers’ 
nuclear arsenals at July 1976:
United States: 2,124 strategic nuclear 
delivery system s — 1,054 land-based  
intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs); 
656 submarine-launched ballistic missiles 
(SLBMs) on 41 strategic nuclear submarines; 
414 strategic bombers. Can deliver about 
8,500 independently targetable nuclear 
warheads.
Soviet Union: 2,404 strategic nuclear 
delivery systems — 1,452 ICBMs; 812 SLBMs 
on 60 strategic nuclear submarines, about 
140 strategic bombers. Can deliver about
4,000 independently targetable nuclear 
warheads.
In addition to their 12,000 or more strategic 
nuclear warheads, both the US and the 
Soviet Union have tens of thousands o f 
tactical nuclear weapons, mostly more 
powerful than the Hiroshima atomic bomb. 
(6)
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The key point however, is not so much the 
number o f strategic delivery vehicles (i.e. 
missiles and bombers) but the total number 
o f bombs that can be delivered. And here the 
US is far ahead.
Most US missiles carry multiple warheads 
(MIRVs — multiple individually-targeted re­
entry vehicles), whereas, Aldridge says, the 
Soviet Union “ has not mastered the ability to 
miniaturize hydrogen bom bs” . For example, 
o f the 41 US ballistic missile submarines, 31 
are armed with 16 Poseidon missiles, each 
missile having 10-14 MIRVs o f 40-kiloton 
yield. “ That means that each of these 31 
Poseidon submarines could destroy at least 
160 cities with bombs at least twice the 
explosive energy that ripped into Hiroshima 
and N agasaki” . (7)
Andrew Mack says that the US has nearly 
three times more nuclear warheads than the 
Soviet Union, largely because o f their five- 
year lead in MIRV technology. He also 
points out that US missiles “ are far more 
accurate than their Soviet counterparts — 
cancelling the m egatonnage/throw weight 
‘advantages’ o f the Soviet missiles” . (8)
From the time the US shifted its nuclear 
strategy from Deterrence to Counterforce, it 
has been modernising and developing its 
nuclear arsenal to achieve a First Strike 
capacity. The whole point o f that capacity is 
to deliver an unanswerable first strike; to 
destroy the enemy’s nuclear weaponry before 
it can strike back. And that means having 
the type o f weapons with the required 
accuracy, which can hit at ‘hard’ targets, i.e. 
land-based missiles in their hardened 
concrete silos, rather than ‘soft’ cities or 
industrial centres.
The US scenario for a disabling first strike 
was spelt out by former Defense Secretary 
Donald Rumsfeld in the Pentagon’s annual 
statement o f 1970:
... The most ambitious [damage limiting] 
strategy dictates a first strike capability 
against an enemy’s strategic offensive forces 
which seek to destroy as much of his 
megatonnage as possible before it can be 
brought into play. An enemy’s residual 
retaliation, assumed to be directed against 
urban-industrial targets, would be blunted 
still further by a combination of active and 
passive defenses, including ASW (anti­
submarine warfare), ABMs (anti-ballistic 
missiles), anti-bomber defenses.... (9)
Robert Aldridge details these military 
‘defenses’ as the four major interacting 
systems the US is developing to first strike 
capacity. They are:
A  m issile  arsenal with 
cou n terforce  accu racy  to 
destroy land-based military 
targets;
An anti-submarine (ASW) 
capability that can instantly 
kill the S oviet m issile- 
launching submarines;
An an ti-ba llis tic  m issile 
(ABM) system and an anti­
bomber system to intercept 
residual retaliation;
* A  space-based  system  to
provide com m u nication , 
navigation, weather, and 
intelligence information, as 
well as to track and destroy 
S o v ie t  e a r ly  w a rn in g , 
c o m m u n i c a t i o n  a n d  
navigation spacecraft.
As stated above, the biggest technological 
breakthrough was the development of 
MIRVs. And the US is now developing a 
more accurate version — the M ARV — which 
can be remotely manoeuvred during re-entry 
into the earth’s atmosphere to correct any 
deviation from the flight path.
The current development o f the US and 
Soviet nuclear arsenals bears out what has 
always been true o f the arms race, sometimes 
called the “ action-reaction cycle” .
Thus four years after the Hiroshima bomb 
the Soviet Union tested their first A-bomb. 
This was followed a day later by the 
formation o f NATO. Nearly six years later 
the Warsaw Pact was signed. In 1954 the US 
deployed tactical nuclear weapons in 
Europe, followed three years later by the 
Soviet Union. In 1960 the first Polaris 
ballistic missile submarine was launched 
and five  years later the first Soviet 
comparable ballistic missile submarine. The 
Soviet Union tested MIRVs five years after 
the first US tests — the US deployed them in 
1970 and the USSR in 1975. By the time the 
Soviet Union had caught up with and 
exceeded the US in numbers o f ICBMs and 
SLBMs around 1970, the Pentagon had 
already switched their emphasis from
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quantity to quality improvements, in line 
with their shift in strategy from deterrence to 
cqunterforce.
Trident Horror Weapon
The Trident is the US N avy’s plan for 
updating the sea leg of the strategic nuclear 
triad. It will be composed o f a new fleet of 
submarines, two generations o f missiles and 
a sophisticated communications system. 
Engineering development o f Trident began 
in 1971. It is scheduled to be operational in 
1981, with thirty submarines planned by the 
1990s. Trident will be based in the Pacific 
Ocean with its home port in Puget Sound, 
near Bangor, Washington.
Trident submarines will be 560 feet long 
(about two football fields) and about four 
stories high. Each sub will carry 24 missiles, 
half as many again as the present Polaris 
and Poseidon. Its longer-range missiles will 
give Trident ten times as much ocean area in 
which to hide than Poseidon.
Two generations of Trident missiles are 
planned. Trident-I will have a range o f 4,000 
nautical miles with a full load o f eight 100- 
kiloton warheads, while being as accurate as 
Poseidon is at 2,000 miles. Trident-I missiles 
will also be backfitted into 10 Poseidon subs 
as from 1980.
The much larger Trident-I I missiles, due 
by the mid-1980s, will only fit into the new 
Trident submarines. They will have a range 
o f 6,000 nautical miles, carrying fourteen 
150-kiloton warheads or seven 300-kiloton 
MIRV warheads, with an accuracy of 300 
feet. However, by using MARVs on the 
Trident-II missile, that miss distance would 
be whittled down to a few feet.
So each Trident sub equipped with 24 
T r id e n t -I I  m is s ile s  a rm ed  w ith  17 
manoeuvring warheads, would be capable o f 
striking any point on over half the earth’s 
surface. With a typical payload o f 75-100 
kilotons per warhead, oneTrident submarine 
could destroy 408 cities or military targets 
with a blast five times that unleashed on 
Hiroshima. A  fleet o f 30 Trident subs would 
be able to deliver an unbelievable 12,240 
nuclear warheads — 30 times the number 
originally thought sufficient for strategic 
deterrence.
Clearly, if  Trident attains the accuracies 
the Navy seeks, it will constitute the ultimate 
first-strike weapon. (10)
In a Saturday Review  editorial th 
A m erican  jou rn a lis t  N orm an C ousins 
pointed out that a Trident submarine 
commander will be the third m >t powerful 
man in the world, next to the US and Soviet 
Presidents. He will control more destructive
"A TOAST GENTLEMEN. T O  THE NEUTRON BOM B.”
"THE BOURGEOISIE OF THE WHOLE WORLD,WHICH LOOKS COMPLACENTLY 
UPON THE WHOLESALE MASSACRE AFTER THE BATTLE,IS CONVULSED B Y  
HORROR AT THE D E S E C R A T IO N  OF BRICK AND M O R T A R ! ,r
KARL MARX, THE CIVIL WAR IN FRANCE
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force than Britain, Italy, Spain, Brazil, 
Argentina, West Germany, Japan, the 
P h ilipp ines, India and Pakistan  put 
together.
Australia’s Role
In February 1978, US Defense Secretary 
Harold Brown confirmed that Trident 
submarines would be based in the Pacific 
and in June the US Navy announced it would 
deploy 13 Tridents in the Pacific and 
concentrate its nuclear strategy for the 1980s 
in this area. (11)
Writing from Washington, John Edwards 
examined the implications o f this strategy in 
a National Times articles entitled “ Australia 
Moves Into Nuclear Frontline” (March 6-11,
1978): “ Australia is to play a much more 
significant role in the strategic weapons 
planning o f the United States, Russia and 
China” , he said. “This will place Australia in 
the front line of any nuclear exchange 
between the United States and either the 
Soviet Union and China, both o f which latter 
now have the capability to attack targets in 
Australia with nuclear missiles.”
This is evident not only from Defense 
Secretary Brown’s February statement, but 
also from a State Department agency 
announcement to Congress a week later that 
the Soviet Union and the US have agreed in 
the SALT negotiations to accept a mutual 
interim ban on the deployment o f mobile 
land-based intercontinental missiles.
These two statements, says Edwards, 
point to the probability that:
* The Pacific will emerge as the principal 
theatre for the deployment o f US weapons 
directed against Russia and China;
* The US defence communications facilities 
located in Australia will play a pre-eminent 
part in the control of at least a proportion of 
these weapons;
* Australia may play an increasingly important 
role in the protection and maintenance of the 
US Trident fleet, both in the Pacific and in the 
Indian Oceans.
U.S. Bases in Australia
It has long been known that the US 
facilities here were an important part o f the 
US nuclear network, although their exact 
operations have been shrouded in secrecy. In 
1974 a US Navy magazine reported that
“ classified messages to Polaris-Poseidon 
submarines deployed in the Indian Ocean” 
are sent from the North-West Cape Station. 
And as Dr. Des Ball pointed out in 1974, the 
North-West Cape base no longer performs a 
nuclear ‘ s ta b ilis in g ’ role when the 
submarines it controls can deliver accurate 
hard-target weapons. (12)
Out of the 20-30 US military, scientific and 
communications facilities in Australia, the 
three most important are the Defence Space 
Research Station at Pine Gap near Alice 
Springs; the Defence Space Communications 
Station at Nurrungar, near Woomera; and 
the Harold E. Holt Naval Communications 
Centre at North West Cape, Western 
Australia.
The Pine Gap base, established in 1968, 
had its lease renewed in 1977 for a further 10 
years. Built at a cost o f $250 million, it is the 
largest and most important base o f its kind 
outside United States territory. One o f its 
major functions is to receive, analyse and 
transmit data from 647 early warning 
satellites, which are used to detect missile 
lau n ch ings, and from  the ‘ B ig B ird ’ 
surveillance satellite placed over the USSR, 
China, India and Indo-China. Two private 
American companies — TRW and F-Systems
— control the Pine Gap operations.
The Nurrungar station provides a back­
up function for Pine Gap. It transmits 
satellite early warning and reconnaissance 
data generated by Pine Gap via military 
satellite to US command centres.
T h e  N o r t h  W e s t  C a p e  n a v a l  
communications station transmits very low 
frequency (VLF) radio signals to submerged 
nuclear m issile -carry ing  subm arines, 
enabling them to launch their missiles 
without surfacing to receive firing orders.
The strategic importance o f North-West 
Cape will be further upgraded by a new 
satellite system, AN-MSC-61. When installed 
in 1980, it will be one o f  21 new facilities 
around the world forming part o f the latest 
p h a se  o f  the US d e fe n s e  s a te l li te  
communications system.
A US company was awarded a contract in 
1977 to supply the satellite terminals. But the 
Australian people, Parliament and even the 
Government, were not informed about this 
upgrading until the information was picked 
up in May 1978 from a leaked US Congress 
memo.
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The Omega navigation station planned 
for Gippsland in Victoria also has a 
significant role to play in the sea leg o f the 
US nuclear network. Its fun ction , in 
con ju n ction  w ith seven  other Om ega 
stations elsewhere, is to allow world-wide all- 
weather navigation for all kinds o f craft, 
both military and civilian. VLF Omega 
signals penetrate sea water to considerable 
depths, so a com pletely  subm erged 
submarine can be guided through any seas 
without revealing its position.
US bases have long made Australia a 
target in the event o f a nuclear war. With the 
development o f Trident as a first-strike 
weapon, any pretence that the bases play a 
defensive rather than an offensive role, is 
shattered. Even journalist Alan Reid, who 
could hardly be classified as a left-winger, 
recently warned o f the dangers to Australia 
from the shift in US nuclear strategy:
... If Australia is to house a facility which 
contributes to the efficiency of a first-strike 
system, carrying atomic warheads, that is a 
quite different proposition from housing a 
facility which is part of a deterrent ... It 
enhances the priority that the North-West 
Cape base would have as a target in the event 
of a major conflagration. (13)
It is clear that the deployment o f Tridents 
in the Pacific and/or Indian Oceans will 
make North West Cape one o f the most vital 
strategic bases in the world. As John 
Edwards points out:
To achieve the accuracy necessary for a 
flexible response, Trident submarines will 
need to be positioned and the Trident-2 missile 
will need to be corrected in flight from land 
facilities. Both these operations may be 
conducted from Australia.
He concludes that all o f these developments
will draw Australia into a role as the junior 
partner in the Pacific and Indian Ocean 
nuclear competition between the great powers, 
so that the exhausted traditional ANZUS 
alliance of regional conventional co-operation 
will be replaced by a nuclear alliance — and 
one little known to the Australian people.
The Nuclear Connection
Turning from  the vertica l nuclear 
proliferation o f the two Superpowers, the 
other main areas o f  concern are the
increasing militarisation of the entire world 
th ro u g h  th e  sa le  and  t r a n s fe r  o f  
conventional, tactical weapons; and the 
growing horizontal nuclear proliferation 
through the export o f  nuclear pow er 
technology and materials to potential 
nuclear weapon countries.
Some people, including sections of the 
peace movement, argue for development o f 
nuclear power for ‘safe’ peaceful energy 
purposes, which they say is essential for 
economic growth, particularly in the Third 
World. At the same time, they affirm their 
opposition to nuclear power being used for 
nuclear weapons. But is it possible to 
separate the peaceful and military in the real 
politics o f our unstable world, and above all
— how can the safety of future generations be 
assured while nuclear power reactors 
constantly produce deadly wastes which 
must be safely stored virtually forever?
In looking at the connections between 
nuclear weapons and nuclear power, the 
most obvious is the danger o f nuclear 
weapons proliferation. But others include 
nuclear waste, high cost and low job creation 
of both nuclear industries, extreme health 
hazards, nuclear industrial-government 
connections and further steps towards a 
police state.
Reactor waste has received most attention. 
Yet in the US 90 per cent o f stored nuclear 
waste comes from the production and 
breakdown/recycling o f more than 30,000 
stockpiled nuclear weapons. And although 
power-generated waste will increase over the 
coming years, nuclear weapons production
— and therefore waste — continues to 
escalate.
The major concerns about the dangers o f 
nuclear power to the health and safety o f 
humanity, the unsolved waste disposal 
problem and the inadequacies o f safeguards 
against the proliferation of nuclear weapons, 
have yet to be answered by the pro-nuclear 
power lobby. And there is growing evidence 
that they cannot be satisfactorily answered, 
at least in the foreseeable future. For 
instance, a recent report from the US 
President’s Office o f Science and Technology 
Policy stressed that it will probably be at 
least 10 years before any of the suggested 
waste disposal methods can be tested 
sufficiently to warrant a decision in favour o f 
one form o f disposal over another. (14)
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The “ second nuclear age”  started when 
India exploded a nuclear device in 1974 (the 
first country in ten years to join the nuclear 
“ club” ).
In the first nuclear age, a country that wanted 
a bomb had to mount an expensive complex 
program. In the second nuclear age, a country 
acquires the capability to produce a nuclear 
weapon with relative ease — as a by-product of 
developing nuclear power. (15)
The US trained 1,100 Indian nuclear 
scientists and engineers prior to 1974 and 
provided the nuclear materials used to 
produce the Indian bomb, while Canada 
provided  the equipm ent and sp ecific  
technology — all in the name o f “ peaceful” 
nuclear energy.
The pro-nuclear power lobby used to argue 
that “ reactor grade” plutonium, useable as a 
fuel in a civilian reactor, was not o f sufficient 
quality to provide the material for an atomic 
bomb. But this was refuted last year by the 
US Energy Research and Development 
Administration (ERDA) who confirmed that 
at the Nevada test site, the US has exploded a 
n u c le a r  d e v ic e  u s in g  re a c to r -g r a d e  
plutonium obtained from a nuclear power 
plant. (16) All a country needs to utilise its 
uranium — U-235 — in the manufacture o f 
weapons is an uranium enrichment facility.
As SIPRI Director, Frank Barnaby, states:
The major problem in controlling the spread of 
nuclear weapons is that the fissile material for 
atomic bombs can be produced on a relatively 
small scale. A 40-megawatt electrical 
graphite-moderated, natural-uranium reactor, 
could, for example, produce about 20 
kilograms of plutonium-239 per year, more 
than enough for two 20-kiloton atomic bombs 
(e.g. Hiroshima-size).
The components for such a reactor could be 
easily and secretly obtained on the open 
market for a cost of less than $20 million. The 
reactor and a small chemical reprocessing 
unit to remove the plutonium from the reactor 
fuel elements could be clandestinely 
constructed and run. (17)
At the end o f 1976, Barnaby says, there 
were 173 power reactors in 19 countries, 
capable o f producing 16,000 kgms o f 
plutonium annually. About 30 per cent o f  this 
was in 15 non-nuclear countries Argentina, 
B e l g i u m ,  B u l g a r i a ,  C a n a d a ,  
Czechoslovakia, West Germany, the German
Democratic Republic, India, Italy, Japan, 
the Netherlands, Pakistan, Spain, Sweden 
and Switzerland).
By the end o f 1980, about 250,000 kgms o f 
plutonium  w ill p rob ab ly  have been 
accumulated worldwide. Austria, Brazil, 
Finland, Hungary, Iran, South Korea, 
Taiwan and Yugoslavia will also then have 
nuclear power reactors.
By 1984, 28 non-nuclear weapon countries 
will probably have nuclear power reactors 
potentially able to produce about 30,000 
kgms annually — theoretically enough to 
produce ten 20-kilogram atom ic bombs each 
day.
How safe are the “ political barriers” to 
horizontal spread imposed by the 1968 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty? About 
100 countries have ratified the Treaty, 
thereby stating their intention not to produce 
n u c le a r  w e a p o n s .  H o w e v e r ,  th e  
overwhelming majority have no capacity to 
do so. And many near-nuclear countries have 
not ratified it, thus keeping their options 
open. Nor have India, France and China. 
The biggest loophole o f the Treaty is Article 
Ten, which says that any country can 
withdraw within three m onths’ notice if it 
deems this necessary in its own “ national 
interest” . Who can say how the fascist 
Pinochet, or Marcos o f the Philippines may 
interpret this?
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The nuclear industry is already beset by 
mounting political and econom ic problems. 
In country after cou n try  people are 
mobilising against nuclear power; and 
achieving significant victories. Last March 
the people o f conservative Kern County in 
California voted in a referendum 2 to 1 
against the siting o f a nuclear reactor in their 
area. The State’s energy policy now excludes 
new nuclear power stations. And on June 30 
a planned nuclear plant at Seabrook, New 
Hampshire, was suspended, following a 
20,000-strong anti-nuclear protest on June 3.
The fight against nuclear power can be 
won through continuing mass opposition 
and the effects o f the industry’s own inner 
con trad iction s. The A u stra lian  an ti­
uranium and peace movements have a 
particularly important role to play. The 
struggle to stop Australian uranium from 
being mined and exported is an important 
national struggle to protect Aboriginal land 
rights, the health  and sa fety  o f  all 
Australians, our environment, our civil 
liberties; and aga in st the continued 
multinational exploitation o f our resources. 
It also has vital international implications 
as a positive Australian contribution against 
the arms race and the spread o f nuclear 
weapons.
The anti-uranium movement has achieved 
a great deal already in its relatively short 
existence, including positive positions by 
sections of the trade union movement and 
the Labor Party. Above all, it has made 
uranium a public political issue and has 
mobilised hundreds jo f  thousands onto the 
streets in the b iggest m arches and 
d e m o n s tr a t io n s  s in c e  th e  V ie tn a m  
Moratorium. Providing this can be built on 
and the movement developed by greater 
involvement o f rank-and-file workers and 
greater unity between the labour, peace and 
anti-uranium movements, together with 
environmentalists and others, the Fraser 
Government and the pro-nuclear lobby can 
be defeated.
A  key aspect o f  stren gth en in g  the 
movement is to increase realisation that the 
struggle against nuclear power and nuclear 
weapons cannot be separated; that the 
struggle to keep uranium in the ground is 
also a struggle against the nuclear arms race 
and for disarmament.
This rea lisation  is g rad u a lly  being 
translated into united activities and a
coming together o f the anti-nuclear power 
and the a n ti-w ar/p eace  m ovem ents 
internationally.
At the Australian People’s Disarmament 
Conference held in Sydney and Melbourne in 
April this year organised by the Australian 
Peace Liaison Committee, many speakers 
stressed the need to develop these links, 
including Joe Camilleri from Melbourne, 
Terry Provance from the USA and Sheila 
Oakes from Britain. At the Hiroshima Day 
Rallies, visiting American biologist and anti- 
nuclear activist, Professor George Wald, 
pointed to the urgency o f developing unity 
among all anti-nuclear activists, to force not 
only an end to uranium mining, but an end to 
the n u c le a r  arm s ra ce  le a d in g  to 
disarmament.
As mentioned earlier, some sections o f the 
peace movement accept nuclear power which 
they maintain can be used safely for peaceful 
purposes, g iven  adequate safegu ards 
against nuclear weapons proliferation. This 
attitude has led to som e d ifferen ces 
internationally and in Australia. The World 
Peace Council was for many years the 
principal body uniting peace movements 
throughout the world. However, recently 
many peace activists have become concerned 
at a tendency to think that all activities and 
movements should be directed by, or 
channelled through, one international body.
The World Peace Council’s attitude 
towards nuclear power, expressed in Sydney 
recently by its President, Romesh Chandra 
(and in its journal New Perspectives 3/78), 
has led to a contradiction between its 
position and the most significant mass 
movement in the capitalist countries since 
the Viet Nam protests. And this is reflected 
among members o f its Australian branch, 
the Australian Peace Committee. If the 
movement here is to achieve the potential 
for developing into a much larger mass 
movement, involving all those working for a 
non-nuclear world, one essential point is that 
no one organisation or ideology can attempt 
to attain a monopolistic position, and that 
the movement is able to reach many more 
people through unity around the common 
goal.
If the struggle against uranium mining in 
Australia were achieved tomorrow, the vital 
problem o f the nuclear arms race and 
disarmament would still be confronting 
humanity. An urgent task is to deepen the
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understanding o f anti-uranium activists 
about the wider dangers o f nuclear power 
and the present nuclear arms race, by 
continuing to project these issues and 
developing closer unity between the peace 
and anti-uranium movements.
For the arms race and disarmament to 
become relevant political issues ir> thp 
A ustralian  context, the very word 
“disarmament” must be translated into 
identifiable goals and campaigns relevant to 
A ustralia . The fee lin g  am ong m any 
socialists that disarmament is not possible 
this side o f world socialism must also be 
combatted. If one accepted that, one might as 
well sit back with arms folded and wait for 
w hatever d isaster m ight befa ll. It is 
tantamount to saying that nothing can be 
done to curb world imperialism and that 
national liberation struggles or the class 
conflict against capitalism aren’t winnable, 
so why bother.
I would suggest that campaigns with the 
potential to involve large numbers o f people 
can be developed around the following issues 
in particular:
* An end to U .S. bases in Australia:
Such a campaign would expose the real 
nature o f the bases and the danger to 
Australia in the event o f a nuclear conflict; 
their vital role in the American nuclear 
network, particularly as part o f a first strike 
strategy; their control by the CIA and the 
complete lack of any Australian control or 
even knowledge o f their functions. Getting 
rid o f the US bases would be a tremendous 
contribution towards disarmament and 
would have far-reaching international 
effects.
* Nuclear-free zones in the Pacific and 
Indian Oceans embodying the closure o f all 
military bases in the region; an end to 
nuclear testing in the region; an end to visits 
o f nuclear-powered ships in Australian ports 
and the deployment o f nuclear-powered 
submarines (such as Trident) in the two 
oceans.
* An independent and non-aligned 
Australian foreign policy embodying an 
end to our subservience to the dictates o f the 
US in particular, our military involvement in 
ASEAN, arms sales to Indonesia or any 
other nation for use in counter-insurgency, 
and a more enlightened, co-operative policy 
towards our South-East Asian neighbours.
* No mining and export o f uranium.
These are tan gib le  p o lit ica l issues 
involving struggle against the Fraser 
Government and being part o f the wider 
struggle against imperialism. The tasks 
seem immense: but so is the struggle for 
s o c ia l is m  a g a in s t  c a p it a l is m  and 
im peria lism . The h ardest obstacle  to 
overcome is people’s feeling o f helplessness 
in the face of the nuclear arms race. But we 
must overcome it and develop mass action 
built on the understanding that the only 
force standing in the way o f nuclear 
holocaust is the power o f  people united in 
their common struggle.
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